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1 Two Packages of Anti-terrorism Legislation in Denmark 
 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the desire to respond with firm, unmistak-
able resolve in order to maintain both international and domestic security dom-
inated global politics, as well as shaped many specific measures enacted by the 
international community and by individual states. In European contexts, na-
tional and EU legislation was significantly affected by, for example, the 1999 
UN Terrorist Financing Convention and Security Council Resolution 1373, 
which was issued shortly after 9/11. With a new determination, European Un-
ion institutions intensified their preparations of various counter-terrorism 
measures; previous to the attacks, negotiations over such measures had been 
moving forward slowly. After 9/11, however, political agreement was swiftly 
reached on two framework decisions: one on combating terrorism and another 
concerning the European Arrest Warrant. In order to comply with the Security 
Council’s resolutions on targeted sanctions, the EU also established common 
blacklist regimes requiring Member States to freeze the assets of listed individ-
uals and organisations. The intrusive effects of these lists and the flimsy nature 
of the procedural guarantees associated with them raise a number of fundamen-
tal questions with regard to due process and fundamental rights.1  
In Denmark, the 9/11 events immediately triggered a series of legislative 
initiatives that were clustered into a single anti-terrorism package enacted in 
2002. In the wake of the 2006 terrorist bombings in Madrid and London, a sec-
ond anti-terrorism package was adopted. The two anti-terrorism packages ex-
panded the ambit of substantive criminal law significantly. These and other 
amendments to the substantive part of the Danish Penal Code (PC) represent 
new, far-reaching forms of criminalisation with indeterminate scope. The 
boundaries of criminal law have been pushed forward in order to encompass 
various new modalities of participation, which are “pre-active” in nature and 
include activities that might represent a hypothetical risk of facilitating actual 
terrorist acts in the future, but may actually be only very remotely linked to 
such activities. The actus reus, as well as the mens rea, requirements for incur-
ring criminal liability are stipulated in quite vague terms, not only in the statu-
tory provisions, but also in the preparatory work for the underlying bills. 
In general, then, the two anti-terrorism packages consist of precipitate 
measures based on preparatory work lacking sufficient legislative quality. For 
example, the new provisions in the criminal law consist partly of verbatim 
transcripts of formulations found in EU law and other international sources; 
these are not suitable paradigms for drafting statutes under a domestic legal 
order. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                
1  See Jørn Vestergaard, Terror Financing – Asset Freezing, Human Rights and the European 
Legal Order, (2011) 2 New Journal of European Criminal Law 175. 
 
 
Jørn Vestergaard: Pre-active Anti-Terrorism Legislation     409 
 
 
 
2  Terrorism Provisions as an Anchorage Point for other  
 Legislation 
 
The provisions regarding acts of terrorism and offences related to terrorism 
enshrined in the Danish Penal Code do not just declare certain acts to be pun-
ishable criminal offences. They also constitute the foundation on which all oth-
er legislation on combating and preventing terrorism rests, giving them a com-
mon point of reference. Thus, the rules in the Penal Code provide the basic 
setting for many other components of Danish anti-terrorism legislation, such as 
regulations that determine the nature and scope of special powers held by vari-
ous government bodies with regard to cases involving “crimes against the 
state”.2 
A whole series of other statutes are linked to these core provisions. There-
fore, the provisions defining terrorist offences are integrated and constituent 
parts of the material criteria for demarcating the limits for other crimes, as well 
as for setting the boundaries of various powers vested in the courts, law en-
forcement and intelligence agencies, and other government authorities. Conse-
quently, the substantive criminal provisions greatly influence decision-making 
regarding, for example, instigating coercive and intrusive measures in criminal 
investigations and proceedings, disclosing or exchanging sensitive personal 
information and other kinds of data, refusing to grant citizenship, expelling 
foreigners from the country, and placing aliens under detention or restricted 
conditions. It is also a concern that the adoption of vague and wide-reaching 
criminal law provisions will negatively impact decision-making in intelligence, 
investigative and administrative-law contexts; in these areas, there is a consid-
erable risk that due process and fundamental rights will be jeopardized. The 
new provisions are also conducive, for example, to an exaggerated government 
propensity to authorise disproportionate control measures – including, in par-
ticular, targeting political activists and people with a non-Danish ethnic back-
ground, who belong to groups that communicate via obscure messages or use 
militant rhetoric. 
 
The core provision on terrorist acts – Danish Penal Code Section 114 
The 2002 anti-terrorism package inserted a new and innovative Section 114 
into chapter 13 of the Penal Code.3 The provision did not in itself broaden the 
already existing scope of criminalisation. Evidently, terrorist acts could earlier 
have been punished under existing provisions concerning various forms of se-
rious crime, irrespective of a perpetrator’s terrorist motive. Politically, howev-
er, there was a desire “to convey more clearly that terrorism in all its forms is 
                                
2  Such offences are determined by the provisions in chapters 12 and 13 of the Penal Code. 
The anti-terrorism provisions in PC Section Section 114-114h are placed in chapter 13. 
Translations of Danish legal texts are the author’s own. 
3  A provision with the same numbering previously contained a so-called “corps ban” against 
supporting or participating in certain militant groups. These provisions have now been 
moved to Section 114 f and Section 114 g, discussed below. 
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unacceptable in a democratic society”.4 Under the new Section 114, the maxi-
mum penalty for terrorism-related crimes now became life imprisonment. 
The amended Section 114 contains a definition of “terrorism”. This statuto-
ry definition enumerates a number of offences committed with the intent to 
seriously intimidate a population, compell a Government or an international 
organisation to do or not do anything, or destabilise or destroy the social order 
in certain vaguely specified ways. The statute is particularly open and far-
reaching, among other things because the Penal Code in line with the Frame-
work Decision on combating terrorism has adopted the term “destabilise or 
destroy [...] fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social struc-
tures” [italics added]. The concept of “structures” is not used in a similar man-
ner anywhere else in Danish legislation. 
The mens rea required under Section 114 may be any form or degree of in-
tent. In principle, therefore, even dolus eventualis (in German, Eventualvorsatz 
or bedingter Vorsatz) could imply criminal liability. The technical completion 
of an offence under Section 114 has been moved forward in the sense that it 
depends on the perpetrator’s preparatory acts and the relevant intent, not on the 
commission of a fully-fledged act of terrorism. A terrorist act can also consist 
of threatening to commit one of the offences specifically listed under Section 
114. 
During the political discussions of 6-7 December 2001 about the EU Com-
mission’s proposal for a Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, the EU 
Council issued a statement in order to express agreement that the proposed 
instrument would cover acts “committed by individuals whose objectives con-
stitute a threat to democratic societies respecting the rule of law and the civili-
sation upon which these societies are founded”.5 Further, it stated that the 
Framework Decision “cannot be construed so as to argue that the conduct of 
those who have acted in the interest of preserving or restoring these democratic 
values . . . could now be considered as ‘terrorist’ acts”. According to the Coun-
cil Statement, the Framework Decision can also not be construed so as to in-
criminate on terrorist grounds “persons exercising their fundamental rights to 
manifest their opinions, even if in the course of the exercise of such rights they 
commit offences”. In principle, this implies that demonstrators and activists 
cannot normally be charged under sections related to terrorism. The legal 
boundaries are, however, still fluid. 
The Council Statement regarding the interpretation of the Framework Deci-
sion is quoted in the memorandum issued by the Danish Parliament’s Judiciary 
Committee to accompany the bill concerning the 2002 anti-terrorism package. 
The Committee noted that the Council Statement should be taken into consid-
                                
4  The Government’s explanatory memorandum to the bill. For more bibliographic informati-
on on cited legal sources, see the author's articles in Danish: Jørn Vestergaard, “Strafferetlig 
lovgivning om bekæmpelse af terrorisme,” (2006) 1 Tidsskrift for Kriminalret 2-13; Jørn 
Vestergaard, Det strafferetlige værn mod terrorisme – nye konventionsforpligtelser mv. ” 
(2006) 4 Tidsskrift for Kriminalret 246-260. 
5  Council of the European Union, Statement 109/02. 
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eration in the interpretation of the new statute to rule out criminal liability in 
atypical cases not reasonably meant to be covered.  
The phrasing chosen in Section 114 is essentially the same as that of the 
Framework Decision. Wording of this sort is not necessarily suitable when it 
comes to defining offences under national criminal law, where a higher degree 
of precision should ideally be sought in accordance with the lex certa principle. 
Indeed, other Member States have opted to implement the Framework Decision 
in completely different ways than Denmark. 
It is a matter of particular concern that Section 114 generally applies a max-
imum penalty of life imprisonment. In doing so, the legislature has, in quite a 
broad area covering very different types of offences, vested vast discretionary 
sentencing powers with the judiciary. This sends a confusing signal to the 
courts and the public, since all offences listed are placed on an equal footing in 
terms of the sentencing latitude. Furthermore, the indiscriminate increase of the 
maximum penalty for these offences to life imprisonment implies that there is 
no statute of limitations for any of the offences listed.  
In a relatively large number of cases, defendants have actually been indict-
ed and convicted under Section 114. Accordingly, it suffices here to point to 
the possible impact of Islamic radicalisation in Denmark, in light of the fact 
that Denmark is a close ally of the USA, that the Danish Government has been 
a very active participant in the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, that 
the political climate in Denmark is utterly tainted by xenophobic and anti-
Muslim sentiments, and that the publication of the cartoons of the Prophet Mo-
hammad in the newspaper Jyllands-Posten has been widely noticed interna-
tionally and has caused anger and uproar in Muslim communities.  
 
Notable cases applying Section 114 
There have been several prominent terrorism cases in Denmark involving the 
application of Section 114. These cases demonstrate the breadth of Section 114 
and give a sense of the situations to which it can apply: 
 
Glostrup case:6 The defendant T was found guilty of attempted terrorism. T 
and two young co-defendants were charged with planning a trip to Bosnia in 
order to procure weapons and explosives for use in a terrorist act at an unspeci-
fied location. The co-defendants M1 and M2 subsequently acquired approxi-
mately 19.8 kg of explosives, a suicide belt, a suicide video, a detonator and a 
pistol with a silencer and ammunition. The attempted offences were prevented 
by the arrest of M1 and M2 by the local police in Bosnia. Both were subse-
quently convicted by Bosnian courts of planning a terrorist act and sentenced to 
prison for eight and six years, respectively. Initially, T was supposed to travel 
with the other two to Bosnia, but he was prevented from doing so by his father, 
who had learned of the plans and confiscated his passport. 
Observing that, on the one hand, T had been found guilty of attempting the 
most serious form of terrorism and that, on the other hand, he had just turned 
16 at the time of the offence, the Supreme Court sentenced him to seven years 
                                
6  U 2008.127 H. 
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imprisonment. Three co-defendants were found guilty by the jury, but the ver-
dicts were overruled by the High Court. The Director of Prosecution [in Dan-
ish, the Rigsadvokat] subsequently dropped the charges against two of the three 
men and pursued a new indictment against the third. At the retrial, this defend-
ant was acquitted by the jury, even though the presiding judge favoured a 
guilty verdict in his summing-up prior to the jury’s deliberations. 
The case gave rise to discussion about the quality of evidence and the ad-
mittance of witness evidence regarding the defendants’ religious beliefs and 
possible radicalisation, including testimony by one of the defendants’ former 
teachers.  
 
Vollsmose case:7 Three defendants were convicted of attempted terrorism for 
acquiring fertilizer chemicals and laboratory equipment, and producing home-
made explosives. This was in preparation for the manufacture of one or more 
bombs for use in a terrorist act at an unspecified location. The Supreme Court 
stated that the ordinary sentence for attempted terrorism by bomb detonation 
and homicide is twelve years imprisonment.8 A fourth defendant was entirely 
acquitted by the jury. The case raised questions about the use of informants and 
undercover agents by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (the Poli-
tiets Efterretningstjeneste or PET), the partial lack of disclosure of case docu-
ments to the defence, the introduction of character witnesses, and the court’s 
exclusion of defence witnesses.  
 
Glasvej case:9 Two defendants, both aged twenty-two, were found guilty of 
attempted terrorism by acquiring bomb manuals and chemicals, and by produc-
ing and detonating TATP, an unstable explosive which they had tested on the 
staircase in the building where they lived and in other places. There had been 
contacts with al-Qaeda and the main perpetrator had attended training camps in 
Waziristan. The main perpetrator was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment, 
the co-defendant to eight years.  
 
 ‘Mohammad cartoonist’ attack case:10 A twenty-eight year old Somalian man 
was convicted, inter alia, of attempted terrorism by endeavouring to assassi-
nate the newspaper cartoonist Kurt Westergaard. The defendant was sentenced 
to ten years imprisonment. The perpetrator broke into the cartoonist’s house in 
the evening of 1 January 2010 by smashing a window with an axe. His inten-
tion to kill the cartoonist was thwarted because the latter had taken refuge in 
his bathroom, which the police had previously secured as a panic safe-room; 
the police arrived just minutes after Westergaard had pushed the emergency 
button. In the High Court, the judges and three jurors voted to uphold the ruling 
                                
7  U 2008.1587 H. 
8  Twelve years imprisonment is also the ordinary punishment for completed homicide. The 
normal penalty for attempted homicide is six years imprisonment.  
9  TfK 2009.762 Ø. 
10  U 2011.2778 V. 
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of the municipal court, while the other three jurors voted to acquit the defend-
ant of the count regarding attempted terrorism.  
 
Lors Doukaev case:11 A 25-year-old Chechen residing in Belgium was con-
victed, inter alia, of attempted terrorism by being in possession of a bomb con-
taining TATP, which he intended to send to the offices of Jyllands-Posten, the 
newspaper that had initially published the Mohammad cartoons. Bringing an 
explosive device and a gun, the perpetrator entered Denmark under a false 
name, registered at the Hotel Jørgensen in downtown Copenhagen using a sec-
ond fake identity, and ordered a bus ticket to Liège under yet another false 
name. Visiting various shops, he wore varying disguises. The bomb exploded 
in his hands in a bathroom at the hotel where he was lodging and, after a dra-
matic chase, he was arrested in a nearby public park. The ruling was sustained 
by the Supreme Court. 
 
Activist arsonists case:12 At the time of writing, five militant, left-wing activ-
ists have been charged with attempted terrorism. The charges include arson 
attacks and attempted attacks on the Police Educational Centre, the Police In-
telligence and Security headquarters, the Parliament building, the Greek Em-
bassy and several buildings belonging to private companies, such as those in 
the fur trade. 
 
Support for terrorism 
Inspiration for the amended Penal Code provisions, which concern conduct 
related to actual terrorist acts, was primarily derived from the templates used in 
the design of various UN legal instruments. The new anti-terrorism legislation 
has made it a criminal offence to support a terrorist or a terrorist organisation 
or to facilitate such a person’s or entity’s activities, even though the general 
and wide-reaching rules regarding aiding and abetting terrorism do not apply.  
Providing economic or financial support to a terrorist, a terrorist group, or a 
terrorist organisation may constitute a violation of the exceedingly vague pro-
vision on financing, etc., in PC Section 114(b):13 
 
“Section 114(b). Imprisonment of up to 10 years shall be imposed on any-
one who  
1) directly or indirectly provides financial support for,  
2) directly or indirectly procures or collects funds for, or  
3) directly or indirectly makes money, other assets or financial or other 
similar services available to 
a person, group or association that commits or intends to commit acts cov-
ered by Section 114 or Section 114(a).”14 
                                
11  Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement, 30 May 2011, unreported. 
12  Copenhagen police charge, August 2011. 
13  Originally PC Section 114a. 
14  Emphasis added; Regarding the current Section 114a, see the discussion below about ter-
ror-like acts, introduced in 2006 under the second anti-terrorism package. 
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The mens rea requirement under Section 114(b) is intent, and even the lowest 
degree of intent is sufficient. This provision also targets the funding of organi-
sations whose activities include both humanitarian and terrorist activities. The 
idea is that it is in principle immaterial whether the actual support “allegedly 
has a humanitarian purpose” if the recipient “is known to commit terrorist 
acts”.15 
The justification offered in the explanatory memorandum is that the Terror-
ist Financing Convention requires the criminalisation of the procurement or 
collection of funds that “in whole or in part” are intended to be used to carry 
out terrorist acts.16 The stated justification is of questionable tenability, since 
the Convention does not explicitly require the criminalisation of acts that have 
an entirely humanitarian purpose. If, in a specific case, it can be ensured in a 
satisfactory manner that no part of the funds are used for funding of terrorist 
acts, but exclusively for supplying food, medicine, teaching materials or for the 
construction of emergency shelters, then a possible course of action might be to 
interpret Section 114(b) restrictively. The judiciary has not subscribed to such 
an interpretation of the statute.17  
Several cases illustrate how Danish law now criminalises humanitarian as-
sistance in some cases: 
 
Fighters+Lovers case:18 Six activists were indicted for attempt to procure 
funding for terrorist organisations. They had been involved, via the company 
Fighters+Lovers, in selling T-shirts worth approximately DKK 25,000 (approx. 
$ 4,500 or £ 2,800) with the goal of transferring a portion of the profit to FARC 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Columbia) and the PFLP (Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine). Allegedly, the money was earmarked for 
purchasing radio equipment for FARC and a printing press for the PFLP. All 
defendants were acquitted by the municipal court, which did not find sufficient 
grounds to consider FARC and PFLP as terrorist organisations. On appeal, the 
High Court found the defendants guilty. It held that FARC had been responsi-
ble for launching indiscriminate attacks that had killed civilians, subjected ci-
vilians to serious violence and carried out kidnappings (including of politicians 
and a presidential candidate), in order to undermine the political process in 
Columbia. The Court also found that the PFLP had, in a number of incidents, 
attacked and killed civilians (for example, by using car bombs and suicide 
bombers), and that PFLP’s militant wing, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, had 
                                
15  The travaux préparatoires to the Government’s bill. 
16  Article 2(1) of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 also requires the criminalisation of 
financing, but does not explicitly require a ban on funding that is meant exclusively for 
humanitarian projects. 
17  In this, the Danish judiciary is in line with the much criticized judgement of the US Su-
preme Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. (2010). The Court ob-
served, inter alia, that money raised for charitable purposes could be redirected to funding 
the group’s violent activities or unencumber other funds for use in facilitating such activi-
ties. 
18  U 2009.1453 H. 
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carried out attacks, including suicide attacks that had killed and wounded    
civilians.  
The fact that the funds in question were allegedly raised for humanitarian 
purposes was insignificant to the High Court’s ruling on the question of guilt or 
innocence. However, one of the judges dissented by stating that FARC must be 
considered a rebel movement and the PFLP a resistance movement; the intent 
to commit terrorism could not therefore be attributed to such organisations. 
Thus, this member of the Court voted to acquit all of the defendants entirely. 
The Court did acquit one defendant, however, finding his participation in the 
fund-raising to be insufficient for purposes of criminal liability. That defendant 
had been indicted solely for the reason that he had placed a poster on his hot-
dog cart, displaying the T-shirts and a web address. The Supreme Court upheld 
the High Court ruling, but suspended all sentences for the reason that the exact 
reach of PC Section 114(b) had been questionable before the trial. 
 
‘Rebellion’ case:19 The association ‘Rebellion’ (in Danish, Foreningen Oprør) 
published documents on its website, calling for European solidarity movements 
to participate in continuing resistance to anti-terrorism legislation, terrorist 
lists, and the international ‘war on terror’. The documents stated that substan-
tial amounts had been transferred to the PFLP and FARC. The Government 
seized these documents, a ruling sustained by the Supreme Court. Later, a 
spokesperson for the association was convicted and sentenced to six months 
suspended imprisonment.  
 
Horserød-Stutthof Foreningen & Den Faglige Klub:20 A seventy-two year old 
chairman for an association of former concentration camp prisoners was con-
victed and sentenced to six months imprisonment, of which four months were 
suspended. Subsequent to the Fighters+Lovers judgement, the survivors’ asso-
ciation had collected DKK 17,700 (approx. $ 3,200 or £ 2,000) for the PFLP. 
Furthermore, the chairman for a labour union movement was convicted and 
sentenced to six months suspended imprisonment for collecting DKK 10,000 
(approx. $ 1,800 or £ 1,125) for FARC. 
 
Al-Aqsa case:21 In 2005, charges were brought under Section 114(b) (originally 
Section 114(a)) against the chairperson and treasurer of the al-Aqsa Associa-
tion in Denmark. The investigation was initiated in 2002, when information 
was received that members of this association had collected and transferred 
funds to organisations and individuals in the Middle East with links to Hamas, 
which was on the EU terrorist list. However, the prosecution service failed to 
provide sufficient evidence that the organisation was part of Hamas. The High 
Court therefore upheld a municipal court acquittal by a tie vote of 3 to 3. 
                                
19  U 2007.1831 HK and Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement, 16 March 2010, unreport-
ed. 
20  Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement, 16 June 2011, unreported. 
21  Eastern High Court appellate judgement, 6 February 2008, unreported. 
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As the above cases show, inclusion of a group or individual on either the UN or 
EU terrorist list will normally constitute sufficient grounds for seizure of as-
sets. On the other hand, the mere inclusion of a person or organization on either 
list is not necessarily sufficient proof in criminal proceedings that the party 
involved is a terrorist or terrorist group. In principle, this determination de-
pends on the court’s assessment of the particular evidence presented. In prac-
tice, however, inclusion on a terrorist list will serve as a compelling presump-
tion that financial or other support for the person or organisation concerned is 
covered by PC Section 114(b).  
 
Promoting terrorism 
An “extended complicity rule” has been added to the Penal Code as Section 
114(e),22 which now prohibits any form of assistance to an individual, group or 
association that commits or has the intention to commit terrorism or act related 
to terrorism. This statute even covers activity which cannot be attributed to 
specific acts of terrorism: 
 
114(e). Imprisonment of up to 6 years shall be imposed on anyone who 
otherwise advances the activities of an individual, a group or an association, 
committing or intending to commit actions included in Sections 114, 
114(a), 114(b), 114(c), or 114(d).  
 
According to the preparatory works of the anti-terrorism packages, the aim of 
this provision, inter alia, is to target anyone who provides professional and 
general advice that is not directly related to a specific terrorist act (for example, 
in the form of a lawyer or accountant offering assistance to an organisation that 
the provider knows commits terrorist acts). This may imply the attribution of 
criminal liability to “a person who, in relation to a specific act of terror may 
only be complicit at third or fourth hand”.23 
However, as cases have shown, at the core of the statute there is an implied 
requirement of reasonableness in its application; accordingly, courts have not 
interpreted Section 114(e) excessively:  
 
Said Mansour case:24 The very first indictment under the new anti-terrorism 
provisions was raised against a Danish citizen of Moroccan origin. This radical 
Islamist was found guilty of public incitement to crime and hate speech. The 
defendant had produced and distributed materials that explicitly call for mili-
tant jihad, by depicting known terrorists and celebrating suicide bombings and 
the killing of innocent hostages. He was sentenced to three years and six 
months imprisonment.  
 
                                
22  Originally PC Section 114b. 
23  The Government’s explanatory memorandum to the bill. 
24  Copenhagen City Court judgement, 11 March 2007, unreported. 
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Al-Aqsa case: In the aforementioned case concerning the al-Aqsa association in 
Denmark, the charges were in principle brought principally under Section 
114(b) and subordinately under Section 114(e). As previously mentioned, the 
case referred to the collection and transfer of funds to certain organisations in 
the Middle East. 
 
TRO Denmark case:25 In a television news programme broadcast by Danmarks 
Radio, the organisation Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) was ac-
cused of having diverted money collected for tsunami victims to the Tamil Ti-
gers, an organisation that appears on the EU terrorist list. The Canadian intelli-
gence service had labelled TRO Canada as a front for the Tamil Tigers. Ac-
counts belonging to the organisation were seized by the Danish authorities. In 
the course of the investigations, TRO Denmark was added to the USA’s terror-
ist list, but the Court was not sufficiently furnished with in-depth information 
as to why the organisation had been included in that list. However, the Court 
found that the conditions for seizure, or freezing, of assets with a view to con-
fiscation had been met by reference to inclusion on the American list.  
 
ROJ TV A/S & Mesopotamia Broadcast A/S METV:26 The charge concerned 
repeat broadcasting of propaganda in favour of the Kurdish organisation 
PKK/Kongra Gel, which had been blacklisted by the EU. The broadcasts in-
cluded interviews with PKK-leaders and sympathizers, coverage of battles be-
tween Kurds and Turkish authorities, and reports from PKK-training camps. 
The indictment was addressed to the corporations as legal persons. The prose-
cutor’s principal claim was that the corporation be legally disqualified from 
broadcasting TV-programmes. Previously, an independent administrative board 
had three times considered the question of revoking the corporation’s broad-
casting licence, but without finding sufficient reason to do so. The Copenhagen 
Municipal Court supported the prosecutor’s claims that the broadcasting sys-
tem has acted as a mouthpiece for the PKK, e.g. by advocating association with 
the PKK and participation in terrorism actions conducted by PKK and by glori-
fication of the PKK and terrorism actions committed by the organisation. The 
companies were sentenced to 40 day fines of DKK 64,000 (approx. $ 1.150 or 
€ 7,2000) and DKK 10,000 (approx. $ 1,800 or £ 1,125) respectively. The 
prosecutor’s demand that the corporations be legally disqualified from broad-
casting TV programmes was overruled. In accordance with the travaux prépa-
ratoires concerning the rules on criminal responsibility for legal persons, the 
court found no authorisation for depriving companies from the right to exercise 
certain rights, as such authorisation is only granted with regard to individuals. 
Thus, the judgement represents a kind of paradox, as the broadcasting system 
has been convicted of facilitating terrorism, but hasn’t been banned from con-
                                
25  Eastern High Court ruling, 8 April 2008. 
26  Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement of 10 January 2012. In addition to indicting the 
two companies, the prosecutor seized their bank accounts in order to secure trial costs and 
payment of possible fines. However, the court held that a freezing measure would infringe 
the defendants’ right of expression under ECHR Article 10, see U 2011.918 Ø. 
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tinuing its activities. As neither the defendants nor the prosecutor are fully sat-
isfied by the judgement, an appellate process is to be expected. 
 
 
3  Terror-like Offences 
 
The 2006 anti-terrorism package further extended the scope of criminalisation 
in a very peculiar and rather diffuse way, via the insertion of a new Section 
114(a) into the Danish Penal Code. The new provisions expressed a wish to 
accede to the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 
from 2005, which obligates states to criminalise incitement to, recruiting for, 
and training in terrorism. However, at the time when the Convention was being 
negotiated, agreement could not be reached on a general definition of terror-
ism. The Convention therefore only contains an empty framework provision 
for so-called “terrorist offences”. This general concept was then “completed” 
by reference to a number of older conventions, listed in an appendix to the new 
European Convention. These other conventions deal with terrorist acts, as well 
as other types of offences, without necessarily identifying a particular purpose, 
motive or intent with respect to intimidating a population, threatening a gov-
ernment, etc. These conventions cover security for diplomats, airlines, mari-
time vessels, nuclear-power plants and platforms on the continental shelf. They 
also cover hostage-taking, terrorist bombings and the funding of terrorism. 
Admittedly, these treaties were adopted with an overall aim of combating ter-
rorism in various guises, but they also include a diverse range of other types of 
acts. The conventions reflect the fact that the UN has not been able to establish 
a consensus on a uniform definition of terrorism, which is why a “salami-slicer 
method” has been employed instead, identifying many different criminal acts. 
Whenever the opportunity to work on a general definition of “terrorism” had 
occasionally presented itself (usually after another serious terrorist act some-
where in the world), an additional convention would instead be introduced, 
focusing on specific actions, which might or might not have a terrorist aim.  
The new Section 114(a) is a rambling, verbose and unreadable statute that 
lists the many conventions mentioned above. It authorises enhanced sentences 
for offences that are covered by these treaties, but which do not constitute ter-
rorist acts in the stricter sense of PC Section 114: 
 
Section 114(a). If one of the acts mentioned under para. 1-6 below is com-
mitted without the act being covered by Section 114, the punishment may 
exceed the statutory maximum penalty for the offence by up to half . . . ..27 
 
The opening of the statute is followed by a long-winded and complicated cata-
logue, in six separate paragraphs, of offences that trigger the prescribed en-
hancement of the ordinarily authorised sentencing maximum. Each paragraph 
                                
27  The second part of the first paragraph under Section 114a provides that the punishment can, 
under certain conditions, be enhanced to imprisonment for up to six years, where the ordi-
nary maximum sentence for the offence concerned is less than four years imprisonment. 
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consists of a long list of selected provisions from the substantive part of the 
Penal Code, accompanied by a requirement that the particular offence is also 
covered by one of the specified treaty provisions. No other provision in the 
Danish Penal Code has ever been phrased in such a chaotic and unreadable 
manner.  
In itself, Section 114(a) solely concerns stricter sentencing for terrorism of-
fences. However, since all the other statutes regarding the prevention of terror-
ism refer directly to Section 114(a), this provision has the actual effect of creat-
ing several new criminal offences. The odd statute constitutes a link to other 
provisions, including the section on support and funding,28 the special and very 
wide-ranging complicity rule,29 new sections on recruitment and training for 
terrorism or terrorist-like acts,30 as well as the provision about public incite-
ment or approval of the offences covered by part 12 or part 13 of the Penal 
Code.31  
In 2008, the Framework Decision on the Combat of Terrorism was amend-
ed to include provisions equivalent to those of the European Convention. No 
additional legislative initiative was needed under Danish law. 
 
 
4  Recruitment and Training for Terrorism 
 
Active recruitment or training 
Under the 2005 European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, recruit-
ment and training for terrorism must be criminalised. The Danish 2006 anti-
terrorism package contained two long sections about this, consisting of the 
amended statutes under PC Section 114(c) and Section 114(d). Both of these 
provisions relate not only to actions covered by the actual provision on terrorist 
acts in Section 114, but also to the additional provision on terror-like activities 
under the new Section 114(a).32 Both Section 114(c) and Section 114(d) in-
clude activities that might lead someone either to commit or facilitate an as yet 
unspecified terrorist act or terror-like activity:  
 
Section 114(c)(1). Imprisonment of up to 10 years shall be imposed on an-
yone who recruits another person to commit or facilitate acts covered by 
Sections 114 or 114(a) or to join a group or association in order to facilitate 
that the group or association commits acts of this nature. 
                                
28  PC Section 114b. 
29  PC Section 114e. 
30  PC Section 114c and Section 114d, respectively. 
31  PC Section 136(2). In 2008, the European Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism was 
amended to include provisions equivalent to those of the European Convention. No additional 
legislative initiative was needed under Danish law. 
32  Both Section 114c and Section 114d authorise enhanced sentencing of up to sixteen years 
for particularly aggravating circumstances. 
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Section 114(d)(1). Imprisonment of up to 10 years shall be imposed on an-
yone who trains, instructs or in any other way teaches another person to 
commit or facilitate acts covered by Sections 114 and 114(a), knowing that 
this person has an intention to use the skills to pursue such an aim.” 
 
The mens rea requirement under both of the cited provisions is intent. Howev-
er, it is uncertain what the requirement is with respect to the concretization of 
such an intent in relation to the activities towards which the recruit-
ment/training is aimed. Ostensibly, the offences criminalised under Section 
114(d)(1) might include training in skills that, under certain circumstances, 
could be perfectly legal to acquire and practise, but which can also be used in 
connection with a terrorist or terrorist-like action. However, the mens rea re-
quirement is intensified in two ways. Liability for a “teacher” requires that the 
“pupil” intends to use the acquired skills for the stipulated purpose, and that the 
former has knowledge of this.  
The second subsections of Section 114(c) and Section 114(d) also ban re-
cruitment and training to commit or facilitate acts covered by Section 114(b), 
which, as mentioned above, prohibits various forms of financial support for 
terrorists or terrorist organisations.33 
 
Passive recruitment or training 
The new provisions in the second anti-terrorism package, Section 114(c)(3) 
and Section 114(d)(3) respectively, also made it a criminal offence to “let one-
self” be recruited or trained “to commit or facilitate” terrorist acts or terror-like 
acts. The European Terrorism Convention, however, does not in any way 
oblige the signatory states to establish such criminalisation. In the Danish Gov-
ernment’s preparatory comments to the bill, this legislative innovation was 
merely explained by a bland remark that, as a counterpart to the criminalisation 
of active recruitment and training for terrorism, it would allegedly be “natural” 
to also criminalise letting oneself be recruited or trained “to commit terrorist 
acts”, and that this would be in line with the general trend to advance the 
boundaries for the use of criminal law to protect society against terrorism.  
 
Incitement to terrorism and expressions of sympathy 
The 2005 European Terrorism Convention obliges signatories to criminalise 
public provocation to commit a terrorist offence. Under Danish law, this did 
not necessitate any criminalisation of new offences, as Penal Code Section 
136(1) already contains a general provision on public incitement to “crime”.34 
However, until the above mentioned 2007 judgement in the case against the 
Danish-Moroccan Said Mansour, this provision had not been used since 1938. 
 
Indirectly, the two anti-terrorism packages criminalised expressions of 
sympathy in relation to terrorism activity to a wider extent than was previously 
                                
33  In Section 114b there is, as already mentioned, a reference to the terrorist acts and terror-
like acts covered by Section Section 114 and Section 114a. 
34  The maximum punishment under Section 136(2) is imprisonment for up to two years. 
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the case. An old provision regarding public approval of a crime against the 
State is contained in PC Section 136(2). Technically, this statute is completed 
by a general reference to all offences under chapters 12 and part 13 of the Pe-
nal Code. As the statutes on terrorism offences are placed in chapter 13, the 
anti-terrorism packages have now given Section 136(2) broader application.  
 
 
5  Territorial Reach 
 
Penal Code Sections 114-114(e) covers not only attacks on Danish national 
interests. The overall object of protection can be “a country or an international 
organisation”, and the territorial reach of the anti-terrorism provisions is not 
subject to limitations. The provisions also include acts that do not require that 
force is deployed in order to exert influence on Danish affairs or to undermine 
the Danish social order; force can be directed against the fundamental interests 
of other countries or international organisations. As far as Sections 114(b)-
114(e) are concerned, extraterritoriality is made explicit by references to Sec-
tion 114 and Section 114(a). Thus, these provisions protect public affairs and 
social orders elsewhere, including from acts committed exclusively abroad. 
This extraterritorial application reflects the Danish Government’s desire to 
address terrorism’s global reach, as required under Security Council Resolution 
1373.  
Such extraterritorial reach would be excessive if the anti-terrorism provi-
sions, with all their ambiguity and vagueness, were applied in such a wide-
ranging manner that any state – including dictatorships and the most repressive 
regimes – were in principle protected by them. The previously mentioned 
Council Statement and the Judiciary Committee’s remarks in its preparatory 
report relating to the first anti-terrorism package help mitigate the risk of such 
a exaggerated application. However, there is a considerable lack of foreseeabil-
ity in this context. As demonstrated by the judgements in the cases discussed 
above regarding support of FARC and PFLP, even oppressive regimes are pro-
tected in instances where the resistance victimises civilians. 
The Danish anti-terrorism laws have been applied extraterritorially in at 
least one case: 
 
Weapons for Bengal resistance movement:35 In 2010, the Ministry of Justice 
decided to extradite a Danish citizen to India, where he was accused of crimi-
nal offences committed in 1995. He acknowledges having participated in drop-
ping weapons meant for a Bengal resistance movement from an aircraft. In 
2002, Indian authorities had submitted a request for extradition subsequent to a 
change in Danish law that had made it possible to extradite Danish citizens to 
states outside the Nordic countries. The Ministry linked the conduct of the ac-
cused to the Danish statute on terrorist acts, which had been inserted into the 
Penal Code as PC Section 114 in 2002, after the conduct in question had oc-
curred. The Ministry also precariously relied on Section 114(f) with the aim of 
                                
35  U 2011.2904 Ø. 
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offering a subordinate response to the requirement regarding double criminali-
ty. The overall effect of these provisions, however, was to justify extradition of 
a Danish citizen to India for alleged terrorist crimes committed outside of 
Denmark. Nevertheless, the Hillerød Municipal Court overruled the adminis-
trative decision on extradition on the grounds that diplomatic assurances of-
fered by the Indian Government could not be taken at face value. This ruling 
was sustained by the High Court. 
 
Corporate liability 
As a secondary effect, the Danish 2002 anti-terrorism package considerably 
expanded the area in which penalties may be imposed on institutions and or-
ganizations designated as legal persons (thus imposing corporate criminal lia-
bility) under PC Section 306. A legal person can now become criminally liable 
for any violation of the Penal Code. The stated reason for such an amendment 
on corporate criminal liability was a reference to the requirements contained in 
the UN Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. However, the scope of the 
Penal Code’s provision on corporate criminal liability is general in its reach; 
that is, it includes not only terror-related activities, but any violation of the Pe-
nal Code.  
 
The prosecutorial authority of the Minister of Justice 
Traditionally, chapter 13 of the Penal Code covers crimes against the constitu-
tion and the supreme Government authorities or, in other words, attacks on the 
State’s internal security. The new provisions introduced by the two anti-
terrorism packages form part of chapter 13 and the 2006 anti-terrorism legisla-
tion added ‘terrorism’ to the title of the chapter. As a matter of principle, of-
fences referred to in chapter 13 of the Penal Code are prosecuted only on the 
orders of the Minister of Justice, pursuant to PC Section 118a. This scheme 
relies on the fact that, in some instances, such offences are tainted by political 
considerations, rather vaguely described and of uncertain reach. This practice 
does not imply that the Minister personally assesses whether an indictment 
should be invoked. Rather, the Director of Public Prosecutions (Rigsadvokaten) 
prepares and submits a recommendation to this effect and the Minister will 
normally adhere to the prosecutor’s advice. However, the fluid state of the law 
in this area entails a significant risk of politicization, arbitrariness and abuse of 
power in relation to intelligence gathering, investigation and the way in which 
the prosecution service exercises discretion.  
 
Evidence problems 
Danish terrorism cases have been characterised by severe difficulties involved 
in providing adequate evidence. However, none of the cases have concerned 
terrorist acts that have actually been completed. The charges have either fo-
cused on the preparation of terrorist acts, or on support or facilitation of terror-
ism activities. Some cases on attempted terrorism have mainly been based on 
information stemming from the surveillance of groups of people over consider-
able time periods. If such intelligence or police information indicates a signifi-
cant risk of an imminent terrorist act, it will trigger immediate pre-emptive 
intervention. At this point, there is not necessarily sufficient evidence to form 
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the solid basis for an indictment, let alone a conviction. However, the risk that 
a terrorist act will be committed may be considered serious enough that it 
would be irresponsible to take chances, even if a reticent and hesitant approach 
with continued surveillance could provide greater clarity about the degree of 
weight behind the suspicions. 
The prosecutor’s material has generally been quite complex and difficult to 
decipher, as much of the information is characterised by a certain degree of 
ambiguity. The monitored individuals communicate (whether via telephone 
calls, internet chat, sms messages, etc.) in a particular jargon, which can either 
be construed as a form of sub-cultural dialect or as a security-conscious code, 
possibly in languages other than Danish. This makes it difficult to determine 
exactly what the aims of the behaviour and arrangements are, and whether a 
specific terror intent can be proven. This has, for example, given rise to evi-
dence being presented on whether the accused’s attitude to society is character-
ised by an ideological or religious “radicalisation”. In cases of funding terror-
ism, it has been necessary to obtain information about conditions in distant 
countries; this has posed particular difficulties in obtaining reliable information 
from independent sources. For these reasons, the acquittal rate has so far been 
relatively high. In several cases, there has been considerable uncertainty as to 
the validity of both convictions and acquittals. This has attracted particular 
attention in cases where jurors and judges have reached different conclusions 
concerning the question of guilt or innocence. 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Recent Danish anti-terrorism legislation raises questions about its compatibility 
with basic principles of the rule of law and due process. The packages of anti-
terrorism legislation introduced in 2002 and 2006 include a range of provisions 
so uncertain and wide-reaching in their application and scope that they funda-
mentally challenge the principle of legality.  
The basic provision in Section 114 of the Penal Code covers terrorist acts 
per se. This provision intended to implement the basic requirements of the 
2002 EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. The Framework Deci-
sion’s terminology is applied directly in the sense that the definition of a terror-
ist act has been transcribed literally into domestic law without further ameliora-
tion. Such a legislative technique causes substantial problems with regard to 
interpretation of the law by the national judiciary. Furthermore, as this chapter 
has shown, a vast number of supplementary statutes are characterised by a sub-
stantial widening of the scope of criminal law. These provisions are inchoate in 
the sense that they criminalise various activities that are more or less remote 
from actual or attempted terrorist acts, as well as participation in such activi-
ties. They not only cover funding and other means of supporting terrorism, but 
any conceivable kind of facilitation, incitement, training or recruitment. This 
modality of criminal law has rightly been labelled “pre-active”. To a significant 
extent, the legislature has even over-implemented various legal instruments 
that are binding on Denmark by virtue of European Union law or other interna-
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tional obligations. The anti-terrorism statutes have been drafted in a somewhat 
loose manner, without sufficiently thorough legislative preparations.  
The provisions in the Penal Code constitute the common reference point for 
all the rest of Danish anti-terrorism legislation. Consequently, the challenges 
regarding the rule of law and due process also relate to secondary legislation in 
fields such as law enforcement, intelligence gathering, public law, the treat-
ment of foreigners, preliminary actions under criminal procedure (wiretapping 
and bugging, for example), data-mining, and room searching, among other 
things. 
Fortunately, the judiciary has acted as a deliberate backstop in certain re-
spects in order to avoid serious interference with the rule of law. 
